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new wars has also changed the rules about
who is a combatant. Even more recent
is the case of Kosovo, where Serbian
military commanders deliberately targeted civilians as a means of staving off
NATO air strikes. It has been precisely
the importance of noncombatants as
victims in the post–Cold War era that
has been the central feature of internal
conflicts and has distinguished these recent intrastate wars. Yet no essay in this
volume brings the historical cases up to
the present.
This anthology is useful for historians
looking backward for examples or precedents. However, the book will not
work for everyday classroom teaching
without supplementation, because the
case studies omit some of the more
current examples, as mentioned above.
Finally, the editors should have added a
final essay about the Geneva Conventions and other public humanitarian
law. The rules of modern warfare and
the centrality of protecting civilians
cannot be divorced from the planning
of any intervention. As the United
States enters a new era of strategic doctrine and preemption, it is especially
important that writing about war include not only the details of decision
making but also the implications that
such acts have on civilians who might
be caught in the middle.
JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN

Senior Program Officer
Peace, Security, Human Rights
United Nations Foundation
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Although the Cold War ended more
than a decade ago, its impact continues
to haunt the international community
to this day. These two excellent works
from the Naval Institute Press will
greatly enhance our understanding of
this uncertain period.
Norman Friedman’s Fifty Year War is
a broad look at the conflict between
East and West. Friedman contends
that the Cold War actually began in
Spain in 1937, “when Stalin tried to hijack the ongoing civil war.” This divide
between the Soviet Union and the
West would not come to an end until
1991. Friedman poses several questions: “Should or did the West understand events in the Soviet Union? Did
the West in fact defeat the Soviet Union,
or did the Soviet Union defeat itself?
Was the Cold War, then, about communism versus capitalism or was it
about old-fashioned Russian imperialism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant
ideology?”
Friedman contends that the Cold War
was in fact a “real war” fought in slow
motion. It was also a war lost by the
Soviet Union for sociopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons. In the
end, Friedman sees Mikhail Gorbachev
as responsible for its collapse, because
he “never understood that his state was
built on terror, not on any kind of popular support.”
While making these arguments,
Friedman also includes some very scary
Cold War near misses, including a 1960
mistake by the new U.S. radar at Thule
that interpreted the moon as a Soviet
missile attack. Also intriguing is
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Friedman’s critical analysis of President
John Kennedy’s Cold War leadership.
With The Fifty Year War Friedman
presents a new, provocative survey of the
Cold War from a joint force perspective
while keeping both sides of the Iron
Curtain in mind. He again demonstrates
why he is considered a leading commentator on international security issues.
Unlike Friedman in his broad landscape
of Cold War history, David Winkler
paints a much smaller aspect of the Cold
War canvas. This is a fine work that details the long road to mutual respect,
safety, and communication on the high
seas between the U.S. and Soviet navies.
Utilizing previously classified official
documents, other archival material, and
personal interviews with senior participants from both sides, Winkler traces
the history of confrontations between
U.S. and Soviet naval forces—confrontations that often proved fatal. Eventually, these Cold War incidents
demanded a solution lest the next such
occurrence escalate into outright war.
The solution was found in 1972, in the
historic pact, known as the Incidents at
Sea Agreement (INCSEA).
INCSEA provided a direct navy-to-navy
channel of communication that would
help to limit and avoid future occurrences. How necessary was INCSEA?
Winkler’s first chapter, “Playing with
the Bear,” clearly reveals how “hot” the
Cold War actually was, unbeknownst to
many at the time. During the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations alone,
over one hundred Soviet and U.S. airmen were killed in air-to-air contacts.
Throughout 1971–72, studies and negotiations took place that led to the signing of the INCSEA agreement by then
Secretary of the Navy John Warner and
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Admiral Sergei Gorshkov of the Soviet
navy. Winkler skillfully illustrates how
the successful negotiations were rooted
in mutual respect and professionalism.
This mutual understanding and respect,
along with the signing of INCSEA,
would do much to end naval harassment
between the Cold War superpowers.
As Winkler points out, INCSEA truly
“is one of the positive legacies of the
Cold War.” One should note that although Cold War at Sea represents
first-class scholarship, the Cold War
specialist is more likely to enjoy it than
the armchair sailor. Nevertheless, with
its superb chronology of Cold War naval incidents and excellent notes, this
work will make a welcome addition to
any serious Cold War library.
ANDREW G. WILSON

The George Washington University

Vyborny, Lee, and Don Davis. Dark Waters: An
Insider’s Account of the NR-1, the Cold War’s Undercover Nuclear Sub. New York: New American
Library, 2003. 243pp. $24.95

Although ultimately worthwhile and
entertaining, Dark Waters suffers from
the strange paradox of inadequately describing underwater events that ought to
be gripping while simultaneously portraying mundane and ordinary events
in a marvelously compelling manner.
Lee Vyborny was a new-construction
plank-owner and member of the first
commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy’s
small nuclear-powered submarine NR-1.
Don Davis has written or coauthored
eleven books.
Overall, the book well rewards its readers, but unevenly. An example of its
bumpiness comes early in the prologue
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